Dr M-PM pow-wow this weekend

Dr M-PM pow-wow this weekend

The highly awaited meeting between the Prime Minister and Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad is likely to take place over the weekend although the actual day and time have yet to be finalised.

However, it was learnt that the Prime Minister’s office has kept Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s diary clear of appointments through the weekend as well as Monday.

He has not committed even to any buka puasa function during the three days.

Abdullah has only one appointment on Saturday, that is, to attend the open house of Datuk Seri S. Samy Vellu after maghrib prayers.

Sources said it showed that the Prime Minister was sincere in wanting to accommodate Dr Mahathir’s choice of date because the former Premier had asked for at least two days' notice when expressing his willingness to meet.

The two men are scheduled to meet before Hari Raya, which is expected to fall on Tuesday. The meeting is likely to take place in Putrajaya.

His aides have also tried to keep today free. Abdullah only has the monthly staff assembly at the Finance Ministry in the morning.

A top Umno official said the meeting was on but declined to comment on when the two would meet.

“But don’t worry, we are determined to see it happen, even if it has to take place on a hill or in a tunnel,” the source said.

Some think that the hours after Friday prayers would be most suitable but today is also the first anniversary of Datin Seri Endon Mahmood’s death and Abdullah is expected to spend it with his family.

The family is expected to visit Endon’s grave and also have a private buka puasa at home.

Abdullah spent yesterday at his Kepala Batas base and returned to Putrajaya after midnight.

Dr Mahathir on Tuesday said that he was willing to sit and talk with Abdullah but said he would leave the date and place of the meeting to the Prime Minister.

His statement has been greeted with relief and hope because his scathing critique of Abdullah’s administration the past months have left many, especially in Umno, unsettled and confused.

The meeting was set in motion by the association for former wakil rakyat or Mubarak.


Will DrM and Pak Lah shake hands or even hug?

SO FAR we only know two things about the impending meeting between Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and his predecessor Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad: That it is going to be before Aidilfitri, which is expected to fall on Tuesday (Oct 24, 2006), and that it is going to be a one-on-one affair.

We do not know the day yet. The most auspicious evening of Ramadan is the 27th, which is tomorrow. It is known as the Night of Power as it is said to be the occasion when Prophet Mohammad received his first revelation from God.

But then surely they would want to spend the evening offering additional prayers and reflecting on their past deeds instead of being cooped up somewhere blustering away at each other.

The meeting could also very well be the eve of Hari Raya on Monday (Oct 23, 2006). By then the last terawih prayers (the additional non-obligatory evening prayers during Ramadan) were already performed on Sunday (Oct 22, 2006) night. So Monday evening is a free evening.

This is, of course, if the meeting is not planned to take place during the day. The aides of the two men who are planning the meeting are taking cognisance of the fact that Muslims must not be angry or lose their temper while fasting.


They are uncertain Abdullah and Mahathir will be as cool as cucumber and maintain their equanimity throughout, so the meeting could be held during the day? Everyone knows that the former PM is an angry man and has a long list of complaints and his successor is adamant that he is right in whatever he is doing and very unhappy with the barbs thrown at him.

As to venue Abdullah said that "the day when we meet, that will be the venue." It is, of course, going to be a room somewhere. It cannot be the PM's office or Mahathir's office at the Perdana Leadership Foundation. One possibility is one of the rooms at PWTC where Umno has its Hq.

After all it is in the end about Umno. And it is to ensure that the party remain united that the veterans and the respected members of the party had nudged the two towards a meeting hinting that the spat between them had gone on long enough.

Now who is to enter the room first. Abdullah is no longer the subservient deputy but a full fledged PM, with all the power of the state at his command, and party president and so he should not be kept waiting. But he may want to be gracious and so enter first to wait for the elderly Tun.

If that happens, it could well set the tone for the meeting. It would also auger well if Mahathir, PM for 22 years, insisted that he will wait for the Prime Minister of Malaysia and the president of Umno.

It could also be planned so that the press cameras could record something as the press conference after the meeting - if one is planned - could not be expected to be much of a story.

This could take the form of the two men arriving at the same time, getting out from their cars almost at the same time, and walking up to each other, smiling and shaking hands and - possibly even hugging.

After all hugging is not uncommon among Umno leaders even if they are rivals or especially if they are rivals. Sometimes they also hug to dispel rumours that they are rivals. The recent famous hugging is between Mahathir and International Trade and Industry Minister Datuk Seri Rafidah Aziz two years ago. It changed nothing.

Malaysians, especially Umno members, are probably very excited about the meeting after months of verbal war between the two even though many do not think it will end Mahathir's hounding of the PM - at least not yet.

But, nevertheless, it is a positive development. Umno supreme council member Datuk Shahrir Abdul Samad thinks so but is unwilling to put much store by it. Others approve of the one-on-one meeting. It could be the beginning of Abdullah and his former boss being on talking terms again instead of doing so through the press or their respective aides.

It could happen that Mahathir would accept what he told this writer a long time ago that different leaders have different styles and that the leadership had to be different also because of the changing times and circumstances.

It could also happen that Abdullah would accept Mahathir as an elder brother - or an elder statesman - who could be occasionally consulted on party as well as national matters and to also occaasionally acknowledge publicly that he owed his position to the former PM.

Umno would certainly benefit from its two staunchest and most loyal members - Abdullah refused to abandon the party when the faction he was in lost its bid for power and Mahathir showed such passion for the party that he was given the title Dr Umno - getting together again and probably working together.

It may be wishful thinking but everyone agrees that the consequences of continued acrimonious public row between the two could only be dire to the nation.


Lim blasts Ling over Nanyang 'mistake'," he had actually tried to sell Huaren Holdings Berhad's stake in The Star Publications in 1989, but had been unsuccessful." said Lim.

The feud between former MCA deputy president Tan Sri Lim Ah Lek and former president Tun Dr Ling Liong Sik is far from over.

Lim came out with guns blazing yesterday after years of silence, accusing Dr Ling of being responsible for Nanyang Press Holdings Bhd’s loss, which he estimated at RM100 million.

He took his former boss to task for insisting that the then purchase of the controlling stake in the company was sound — despite the recent sale of 21.01 per cent of the shares.

Lim said the MCA announcement on Tuesday that the party was only retaining a 23.38 per cent stake in the company was proof that Dr Ling had made a mistake.

"If he’s bold enough, he must apologise to both MCA members and the Chinese community. They expect an apology and that’s the least he can do," he said when commenting on Dr Ling’s statement that the purchase in 2001 was politically and commercially right.

Lim, who stepped down with Dr Ling in 2003 to settle a leadership tussle, urged Dr Ling to "be a gentleman and apologise".

He said Dr Ling should also stop blaming the present party leadership for losses suffered by Nanyang Holdings, which publishes Nanyang Siang Pau and China Press.

"Dr Ling is responsible for the losses. Without him as president, the acquisition would not have gone through. This is a fact he can’t deny," he said.

Party president Datuk Seri Ong Ka Ting had announced that Huaren Holdings, the investment arm of MCA, had sold the shares to Ezywood Options Sdn Bhd, a company controlled by Sarawak tycoon Tan Sri Tiong Hiew King.

Lim also took issue with Dr Ling over who was responsible for MCA’s acquisition of Star Publications Bhd, which publishes The Star.

He said the decision to take over Star Publications was made by former president Tan Sri Lee San Choon. He said Dr Ling had wanted to sell 39 per cent of Star shares to Malaysian Plantations Bhd managing director, T.K. Lim, who held a 12 per cent stake, in November 1989.

Lim said Dr Ling had claimed that the sale would enable the party to settle debts totalling nearly RM14.5 million.

He said that Dr Ling had tried to sell Huaren's 39 per cent stake in the English newspaper to Malaysian Plantations Bhd, a subsidiary of Kamunting Corporation, which Lim claimed at that time was controlled by Dr Ling's good friend, Lim Thian Kiat.

"I would like to put the record straight, that Dr Ling had nothing to do with the effort to acquire The Star by Huaren. It was during the time of former MCA president Tan Sri Lee San Choon that Huaren acquired a majority stake in Star Publications.

"In Nov 1989, Dr Ling actually tried to dispose off all of Huaren's 39 per cent stake in The Star to Malaysian Plantation Berhad to try and free Huaren from the bulk of its debts," he told reporters here Thursday.

Lim said that he was bringing this up now as "Dr Ling had tried to claim credit" for the Star purchase in his press conference on Wednesday by implying that it was during his leadership that the MCA bought the majority stake in the media group.


"Former Star director Datuk Wong Mook Leong objected to the proposal and the rest of the central committee members agreed. Had the sale gone through, MCA would have lost its majority stake in the company," he said.

Meanwhile, former vice-president Datuk Chua Jui Meng, who challenged Ong for the party presidency and lost, said it was common knowledge since 2001 that the party would eventually sell Nanyang to Tiong.

"The Chinese community knew about this intention all along. It’s no secret," he said.

Chua said it would have been better for Nanyang to be sold to another company to prevent allegations of monopoly besides creating space for competition.

He hoped Tiong would fulfil his pledge to ensure media independence for the newspapers.

Huaren Holdings Berhad its MCA's wholly owned investment arm.


Harakah Daily reported that : 'A coalition of more than 30 political parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are planning to stage a protest on Oct 30, against the "secretive" Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations held between Malaysia and the United States.'

Some 5,000 participants are expected to be present at the event to be held at 10am in front of Sheraton Imperial Hotel here. The protest also coincides with the start of the third round of negotiations which is expected to be concluded Nov 3.

Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) central committee member Dr Siti Mariah Mahmud said the public were left in the dark over the details of the negotiation as well as its expected effect on them.

"Products from the United States could flood the country if this FTA comes into effect," she said when met after a press conference on Oct 19.

Others present included the coalition against the Malaysia-United States FTA chairman Dr Xavier Jayakumar and representatives from The Opressed People Network (JERIT), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Socialist Party of Malaysia (PSM)....(read more)

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US Urges Seoul to Pressure N. Korea

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Thursday urged Seoul to use its leverage to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, saying that she did not come to South Korea to dictate what Seoul should do.

``Everyone should take stock of the leverage we have to get North Korea to return to the six-party talks,'' she said at a joint news conference with Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon.

Rice's remarks in Seoul, the second leg of her four-nation tour, were interpreted as putting pressure on South Korea to effectively implement inspections of cargo going to and from North Korea to prevent trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

But she tried to brush off the impression that Washington is goading Seoul into a hard-line policy against North Korea.

``I did not come to South Korea nor do I go anyplace else to try to dictate to governments what they ought to do,'' she said.

Seoul has been worried that friction during the inspection process could develop into full-scale armed conflict.

But Rice underlined that the United States has no desire to do anything to escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula or at sea, saying such a negative development ``could not be more wrong.''

The two Koreas are still technically at war, as the 1950-53 Korean War did not end with a peace treaty. The armistice agreement prohibits hostile acts on land, sea or air between the two.

Before holding the press conference, Rice had an 80-minute dialogue with President Roh Moo-hyun. It was not immediately known what they discussed during the Chong Wa Dae meeting.

``South Korea and the United States will closely cooperate in forcing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program,’’ the presidential office said in a brief statement.

But the New York Times reported a day earlier that Rice would ask Seoul and Beijing to focus their efforts on conducting inspections in their own territories, including at ports and on suspicious ships, trucks and aircrafts, rather than inspecting every piece of North Korean cargo.

Quoting an unnamed American official, the newspaper said Rice will urge Seoul and Beijing to create a strict system of radiation monitoring and inspections to prevent North Korea from smuggling nuclear materials into or out of the country.

Seoul has been reluctant to fully join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which was launched in 2003 to stop the trafficking of WMDs, their delivery systems and related materials to and from what the United States calls ``rogue states,'' such as Iran and North Korea.

Describing PSI as ``effective but not confrontational,'' Rice claimed that it is not a blockade or embargo on North Korean goods.

As for U.S. requests for a thorough review of Seoul's inter-Korean economic projects, South Korean officials said they will introduce changes in a way that could reduce American concerns about the possibility that the North is diverting the revenue for weapons development.

Ban and Rice later joined Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who came to Seoul for three-way talks.

Ban said that a possible second nuclear test by North Korea would aggravate the current situation. ``We agreed that in case it happens, there should be more grave consequences,'' he said.

His warning came after a ranking North Korean foreign ministry official indicated that the North was ready to go ahead with another nuclear test, following the first on Oct. 9.

Asked if Washington should not be surprised by a second test, Li Gun, deputy head of North Korea's foreign ministry, told U.S. television network ABC, ``That's right, yes.''

But a second test within the week is not likely. A high-profile Chinese delegation led by State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan was visiting Pyongyang to find a peaceful way out of this nuclear standoff.

``I hope it (China) has been successful in saying to North Korea that there is really only one path, which is denuclearization and dismantlement of its programs,'' Rice said.

Tang met with Kim Jong-il, the North's reclusive leader, and delivered Beijing's message regarding the nuclear test, China's foreign ministry said. He arrived in Pyongyang on Wednesday with Chinese Vice Foreign Ministers Dai Bingguo and Wu Dawei. Wu is concurrently China's top envoy to the six-party talks.

The first nuclear test prompted the U.N. Security Council to adopt a resolution on Oct. 14 that imposed non-military sanctions and warn Pyongyang not to aggravate the situation.

But Pyongyang labeled the resolution a ``declaration of war'' and vowed to take ``brutal and merciless'' measures if any nation dares to menace its sovereignty and autonomy.



Operation Enduring Freedom: A Retrospective

It has become a given, even among many progressive critics of Bush administration policy, that while the U.S. war on Iraq was illegal, immoral, unnecessary, poorly executed, and contrary to America's national security interests, the war on Afghanistan—which was launched five years ago last week—was a legal, moral, and a necessary response to protect American national security in the aftermath of 9/11. Virtually every member of Congress who has gone on record opposing the Iraq War supported the Afghanistan War. Similarly, a number of soldiers who have resisted serving in Iraq on moral grounds have expressed their willingness to serve in Afghanistan.

Relatively speaking, the war in Afghanistan has not been nearly as much the unambiguous tragedy as the U.S. war on Iraq. Only the most committed pacifists or the most extreme among the ideological critics of U.S. intervention would have ruled out the possibility of at least some use of force against al-Qaida following the 9/11 attacks against the United States.

Were it not for the Iraq War, however, there would be a lot more debate and serious questions regarding U.S. policy in Afghanistan. On the fifth anniversary of Operation Enduring Freedom, the large-scale civilian casualties inflicted by U.S. forces, the torture and abuse of detainees, the ongoing suffering and violence in that country, and the resurgence of the dreaded Taliban all demand a significant rethinking of the war.

Non-Military Options

The first question is whether al-Qaida's operational base in Afghanistan could have been destroyed and Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders could have been brought to justice without the use of military force. Was a war of this magnitude really necessary?

The Bush administration insisted that it launched its war against Afghanistan only after the Taliban regime had refused to accept non-military means of resolving the conflict such as handing over bin Laden. Unfortunately, the absence of an International Criminal Court at that time, delayed in large part by U.S. objections, made it impossible for the Taliban to find a face-saving means of bringing bin Laden to justice without giving him to a hostile foreign government. Furthermore, the United States refused Taliban requests for evidence that bin Laden was connected with the terrorist attacks, even though such evidence presumably existed at the time and sharing such evidence is normally expected before complying with an extradition request.

In addition, Pakistani and British newspapers reported that in late September and early October, leaders of Pakistan's two Islamic-identified parties negotiated a deal that could have avoided war. According to these reports, the Taliban was apparently willing to extradite bin Laden to Pakistan to face an international tribunal that would then decide whether to try him there or hand him over to the United States. However, U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain pressured Pakistan's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, to kill the deal. An American official was later quoted as saying that “casting our objective too narrowly” risked “a premature collapse of the international effort if by some luck chance Mr. bin Laden was captured.” In short, the Bush administration appeared to prefer going to war than bringing bin Laden to justice.

Other U.S. demands were even more difficult for the Taliban to accept: the Bush administration demanded the expulsion of all al-Qaida fighters, even though most had nothing to do with foreign terrorist operations but instead were brought in by bin Laden as a mercenary force that served as the backbone of the Taliban's defense against the Northern Alliance. Similarly, the Taliban viewed the Bush administration's additional demand of unfettered U.S. inspections throughout the country as an unreasonable encroachment of Afghan sovereignty.

The United States might have pursued another non-military option by taking advantage of the deep divisions within the Taliban and the restive political leaders in the southeastern part of the country. Such an exploitation of political differences might have also broken the impasse regarding al-Qaida's presence in Afghanistan, which was causing great resentment even among some Taliban partisans. No attempts from the Bush administration were forthcoming, however.

It is very possible that such efforts would have failed anyway, requiring serious consideration of military options. This leads to the second question. Why did the United States focus on high-altitude bombing instead of precisely targeted small-unit commando operations, which would have presumably been a more appropriate tactic against a terrorist group like al-Qaida?

Military Failures

When the Taliban refused to give in to its demands, the United States—with support from Great Britain—began a major bombing campaign against Afghanistan on October 7, four weeks after the alleged al-Qaida attacks against the United States. Given the physical devastation of the preceding 20 years of conflict on one of the poorest countries in the world, the United States conducted war on what some strategic analysts called “not a target-rich environment.” General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that by the third day of the air strikes U.S. planes were returning with their ordnance since they could not find obvious targets. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld added, to the laughter of assembled journalists, “We're not running out of targets. Afghanistan is.”

The U.S. military operation resulted in widespread civilian casualties. During the heaviest phases of the air strikes that fall, American bombs struck a Red Cross food convoy, a military hospital, a boys' school, an old age home, several small villages, and residential neighborhoods. Twice, U.S. planes attacked a Red Cross food distribution center. Amnesty International demanded “an immediate and full investigation into what may have been violations of international and humanitarian law such as direct attacks on civilian objects or indiscriminate attacks” by the U.S. military. A study by Carl Conetta of the Project on Defense Alternatives estimated that, by the end of the year, civilian deaths from the bombing ranged between 1,000 and 1,300. Another study, by Professor Marc Herold of the University of New Hampshire, estimated that the civilian deaths toll had risen to above 3,700. In addition, Conetta estimates conservatively that the U.S. air campaign created more than a half million additional refugees as well as an additional 3,200 civilian deaths from starvation, exposure, and related illness and injury sustained while trying to flee from the bombing. These civilian deaths are particularly tragic given that the Afghan people were the first and primary victims of the Taliban, perhaps the world's most totalitarian regime during its five years of rule.

Since these estimates were first made at the end of 2001, the civilian death toll may have doubled. The number of civilian casualties—from both the bombing and the resulting refugee crisis—have far surpassed the numbers killed in the Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and on the four hijacked airliners.

A case can certainly be made that there is a significant difference in moral culpability between terrorists who kill civilians on purpose and military personnel who kill civilians accidentally. However, most U.S. bombing raids in Afghanistan have taken place when there was no serious enemy fire and when the Americans had plenty of time and technology to avoid such mistakes. Manslaughter may not be as bad as murder, but it is still a crime. The emphasis on high-altitude bombing was less a strategic necessity than an effort to avoid casualties among U.S. pilots. Such a trade-off is understandable when soldiers face enemy soldiers, but it is unethical and illegal when the result is a higher civilian death toll. The high rate of casualties among Afghan civilians seemed particularly questionable since none of the terrorists involved in the hijackings and none of their leaders were Afghans. The 9-11 plotters were outsiders who had taken advantage of Afghanistan's political tragedy, which was rooted in foreign invasion over 20 years earlier. Similarly, Afghan citizens did not elect the Taliban and had no party in the decision to provide sanctuary for bin Laden and his followers.

Fighting Terrorists

A war against a foreign government involves clear, fixed targets such as command-and-control centers, intelligence headquarters, heavy equipment, major weapons stockpiles, large concentrations of troops, and major military complexes. A war against a terrorist group is not so straightforward. Due to the nature of attacks organized by small groups using clandestine methods, so-called “terrorist bases” generally contain no tangible assets that can be seriously crippled by military strikes. As a result, such air campaigns have a mixed success rate at best, particularly in poor rural countries that have few obvious targets to destroy or damage.

Furthermore, the Taliban regime's provision of sanctuary to bin Laden and his supporters was not a typical case of state-backed terrorism. As a result of bin Laden's personal fortune and al-Qaida's elaborate international network, al-Qaida did not need and apparently did not receive direct financial or logistical support from the Afghan government. If anything, al-Qaida had more influence over the Taliban than the Taliban had over al-Qaida.

The further decentralization of al-Qaida operations resulting from the loss of its base in Afghanistan has made it even harder to track down and arrest or eliminate its operatives. Much of the terrorist network's capability to launch terrorist attacks has always resided outside of that central Asian country. Carl Conneta predicted in early 2002—correctly, according to recent intelligence reports—that:

The capacity of Al-Qaida to repair its lost capabilities for global terrorism rests on the fact that terrorist attacks like the 11 September crashes do not depend on the possession of massive, open-air training facilities. Warehouses and small ad hoc sites will do. Moreover, large terrorist organizations have proved themselves able to operate for very long periods without state sanctuaries—as long as sympathetic communities exist … Thus, Al-Qaida may be able to recoup its lost capability by adopting a more thoroughly clandestine and “stateless” approach to its operations, including recruitment and training.

Indeed, the key figures in the 9/11 attacks lived in residential neighborhoods in Hamburg, Germany, not in the bombed-out “terrorist bases” in Afghanistan. Similarly, they received more training from flight schools in the United States than from military camps in Afghanistan. No countries outside the Taliban's Afghanistan have formally granted sanctuary to the al-Qaida network, but these terrorists have still continued to operate.

Regardless of the nature of the Taliban government or its support for al-Qaida, the image of one of the richest nations in the world bombing one of the world's poorest nations contributed to growing anti-American resentment, particularly in the Islamic world. The New York Times noted four weeks into the bombing campaign that “portraits of the United States as a lonely, self-absorbed bully taking out its rage on defenseless Afghanistan are on the rise.”

Much of this anti-Americanism could have been avoided had the United States found a means of avoiding military action in Afghanistan or if the military response had been limited to special operations and tactical air strikes. Indeed, the most urgent action related to the post-September 11 defense needs were related to al-Qaida cells outside of Afghanistan, which would be primarily the responsibility of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Even if an international consensus had developed to oust the Taliban regime, the United States and its allies should have taken the time to lay the political groundwork for a post-Taliban government and prepare post-war peacekeeping troops and development aid prior to the launch of military action.

Most American allies supported this strategy, but the Bush administration opposed it. As Conetta observed, “The lack of proper political preparation makes it harder to achieve military success and raises its cost.” Indeed, the Bush administration paid very little attention to the political future of Afghanistan. The Bush administration has “one part-time upper-middle-level figure working on the political side,” Afghan scholar Barnet Rubin noted soon after the launch of the war on Afghanistan in 2001, “and they've got all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff working on the military side.”

A Less Secure America

While many Americans celebrated the U.S. triumph over a few thousand Pashtun tribesmen in Afghanistan, getting involved in such a tribal war has not likely made the United States more secure. The United States has little to show for its efforts beyond the overthrow of the weak and impoverished Taliban regime. It was unable even to capture bin Laden. As one veteran British journalist noted, “There is no victory in Afghanistan's tribal war, only the exchange of one group of killers for another.” Not long after the Taliban fell came widespread reports of massacres of prisoners by Northern Alliance forces, some of which may have had U.S. complicity. Referring to non-Afghan fighters in Afghanistan, Rumsfeld declared that “they will either be killed or taken prisoner,” highlighting U.S. ambivalence toward such atrocities.

The Bush administration's lack of apparent concern over what would happen to Afghanistan after the ouster of the Taliban is at the root of the country's deteriorating situation today. The United States, while continuing counter-insurgency operations in various parts of the country, refused to provide forces for the European-led UN peacekeeping operation dispatched to Afghanistan to operate beyond the capital of Kabul. In recent years, the United States has taken leadership in bombing a country but relied on the UN to provide the subsequent humanitarian relief and the Europeans to provide post-war security. The hesitancy in getting involved in peacekeeping operations does not extend to an unwillingness to engage in other military operations, however. The U.S. Air Force has engaged in air strikes against rival forces of the Afghan government that had no affiliation with al-Qaida or the Taliban, despite Congress not having authorized the use of military force beyond those responsible for the 9/11 attacks or those harboring them.

The initial U.S. victory over the Taliban regime was more difficult than some hoped but quicker than others feared. Unlike the Soviets, who faced as many as 100,000 Afghan resistance fighters armed with sophisticated American equipment, the Taliban were a small ragtag group of a few thousand tribesmen.

Ridding the world of perhaps the most oppressive and misogynist regime on the planet could be considered a worthwhile result whether or not it enhances the struggle against terrorism. However, questions remain as to whether the regime would have shortly collapsed from within as some had predicted; whether suddenly bringing to power opposition warlords has been worth the price in terms of Afghanistan's ongoing violence, instability, reinvigorated opium trade, and other problems; and, whether the devastation from the U.S. assault will create a reaction that will lead to the rise of new extremists in the future. Also worthy of critical evaluation is whether the United States is culpable for creating the conditions that brought the Taliban to power in the first place.

While the serious negative legal, moral, and security implications of the U.S. war on Iraq remain in the forefront of debate today, similar concerns regarding the U.S. war on Afghanistan should not be ignored.

- Steven Zunes

Stephen Zunes is Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy In Focus Project. He is a professor of politics and the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003.


Malaysia Mahathir Abdullah Ahmad Badawi MCA Nanyang Press Seoul N. Korea China Condoleezza Rice USA Bush